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Abstract: In a federated system, it is not uncommon for a user profile registered to a particular 
system to contain enough attributes to request services from that system. Other attributes may be 
missing from that profile when services are requested from another system. The problem is that 
currently, when a change in user attributes happens, it is very difficult for the federation to 
incorporate the changes in order to resolve the conflict of attributes and maintain the consistency 
of attributes of users between different systems. Currently ready-for-deploy systems such as 
Liberty Alliance, Microsoft Windows CardSpace (formerly InfoCard) and Shibboleth do not 
address this issue efficiently. In general, consistency issues of user attributes in federated system 
via a 2-dimentional view: consistency between member systems (horizontal consistency) and 
consistency between federation and local system (vertical consistency). In this paper, we discuss 
the issue of horizontal consistency to achieve better interoperability and fine-granularity for access 
control decisions in a federated system by analysing the two approaches to achieve the 
consistency of user attributes: attribute synchronisation and delegation. 
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1. Introduction 
Modern enterprises are now pervaded by information systems. There are stronger demands for industrial 
vendors to provide increasingly general-purpose solutions that must be configurable so that they can be 
deployed in a wide range of solutions. This leads to an increasing demand to federate existing systems to 
achieve certain objectives, especially to address the complexity, flexibility and scalability which the 
traditional distributed architectures are unable to cope with.  
It is not uncommon that most enterprises are facing demands to integrate and incorporate together 
the many different, possibly heterogeneous systems, which have been independently designed and 
developed, to allow synchronised access so as to emulate one large unified system. At the same time, 
these data bases have to be able to maintain local autonomy and be able to continue working as an 
independent entity. This problem has introduced a new distributed architecture known as federated 
systems [9, 14]. 
In this context, federated identity management has recently emerged as a potential solution for user 
management across the federation. The main motivation of federated identity management is to provide a 
mechanism to enhance convenience via a single sign on capability and user privacy as well as to decrease 
the identity data-store overload via decentralisation. However, a non-trivial problem has been identified, 
the problem of managing user profiles across a federated system [15]. Every new addition to a federated 
system is subject to incorporating a new user identity entity within the user database. It can be a costly 
and complex approach for the creation, maintenance and termination of user identities. Identity 
management across a federated system can result in over-burden tasks that must span the entire federated 
system.  
Due to the distributed and autonomous nature of the federation, consistency between the federal and 
local and inter-domain environments has proved to be one of the major issues for the research 
community to explore. Consistency of access control in a federated system can be considered in a 2-
dimentional view: consistency between member systems (horizontal consistency) and consistency 
between federation and local system (vertical consistency).  
Ideally, access is only allowed when there is no conflict of policies and/or attributes of users. 
Furthermore, user profiles registered to a particular domain may contain enough attributes to request 
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services from that domain but other attributes may be needed from that profile when services are 
requested from another domain.  
The problem is that currently, when a change in user attribute happens, it can be very difficult for the 
federation to incorporate the changes to resolve the conflict of attributes and maintain the consistency of 
attributes of users between the different domains to make the access control decision. Currently ready-
for-deploy systems such as Liberty Alliance, Microsoft Windows CardSpace (formerly InfoCard) and 
Shibboleth do not address this issue efficiently [4, 7, 16]. So it is difficult to make an access control 
decision due to the lack of a mechanism to maintain the consistency of user attributes across the 
federation.  
This paper discusses the issue of horizontal consistency to achieve better interoperability and fine-
granularity for access control decisions in a federated system by analysing the two approaches to achieve 
the consistency in user attributes: attribute synchronisation and delegation. In this paper, an attribute is 
defined as any characteristic related to an identity such as location, organisation, role, privileges, etc. 
Section 2 briefly reviews federated identity management. The remainder of this paper will 
concentrate on the substantial issue of maintaining consistency of user attribute profile across federated 
system. Section 3 presents the study about the impacts of consistency on access control decisions. 
Sections 4 and 5 provide an overview about the Federated Identity Profiling and the attribute 
synchronisation approach to maintain consistency. Section 6 shows how delegation can be used as a 
better alternative to achieve the consistency in attributes of the same user across federated domains in the 
federation. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Federated Identity Management 
In general, there are three types of identity management approaches: isolated identity management, 
centralised federated identity management, and distributed federated identity management [15].  
The isolated identity management model is the most conservative and primitive of the three 
approaches. Each member system of the federation governs absolute authority and its own security 
framework, identity management domain, as well as its own way of maintaining the identities and the 
attributes of identities. Thus, this model is simple to implement and provides tight control on users via its 
own security framework. However, this model puts a significant burden on users as users have to manage 
multiple identities and so it degrades user convenience. 
In the centralised federated identity model, all members of the federation must be in the circle of 
trust. There is only a single identity provider and manager in this model. The single identity provider will 
be the sole authenticator which has central authority over the identity management task. This approach 
provides simple and easy access for users to service providers. This model also reduces the management 
load but still be able to maintain a tight control over the security framework and user identities. This 
approach is well suited for large organisations under the umbrella of a single authority such as branches 
or members of a multinational company or agencies of a government. The main problem of this model is 
that the single identity manager can be a single point of failure. 
The distributed federated identity management model provides a promising solution for identity 
management [15, 18]. In this model, a set of common agreements, standards and technologies must be 
utilised to enable service providers the ability to verify identities issued by other identity providers in the 
federation. Authentication, thus, becomes a distributed task as each member in the federation will take 
part in the authentication process. This model increases the flexibility and availability as well as 
overcoming the single point of failure issue identified in the centralised federated identity management 
model. However, the cross recognition issue (policies, risk profile or user attributes) make distributed 
identity management a complex task. An example of distributed federated identity management is 
Liberty Alliance.  
The following table provides a comparison between the three models. 
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Characteristic Isolated Model Centralised Model Distributed Model 
Flexibility Low Medium High 
Complexity Low. Easy to implement 
as each service provider 
has its own security 
framework. 
Medium due to the 
difficulty to achieve the 
common agreement 
between service 
providers. 
High due to the high trust 
requirements, and 
difficulties in technical 
and legal issues. 
Usability High but only well suited 
for users with small 
number of identities 
otherwise the usability is 
low when then number of 
service providers 
increases. 
High. Well suite for 
service providers under 
single managements 
High as the ability, in 
theory, to incorporate any 
large number of service 
providers 
Management 
Cost for Service 
Provider 
Low Medium High due to the 
management issues in 
cross-recognition of user 
identity and attribute, risk 
profile and security 
policy as well as efforts 
in maintaining 
consistency but this 
needs to be 
counterbalanced that the 
cost per user is actually 
reduced across the 
federated system. 
Management 
Cost for User 
High when user must 
manage a large number of 
identities. 
Low Low 
 
Table 1: A comparison between 3 identity management models 
 
Among these three models, the distributed federated identity management model has the most 
potential with the high flexibility, usability and low management cost for user as identified in Table 1. 
That is, the distributed federated identity management model meets the objectives noted in Section 1 
concerning complexity, flexibility and scalability.  Therefore, the high flexibility and low user cost are a 
substantial advantage over the other two models.  The complexity issue is manageable and as such it is 
not such a disadvantage in the whole scheme. The rest of this paper will focus on the consistency issue 
on the distributed federated identity management model. 
3. Consistency and Access Control in Federated Systems 
In a federated system, consistency of user attributes plays a very important role. In some cases, the 
authorisation decision is made and derived by the combined effort of both federation and local authority. 
Basically, there are two approaches to derive final authorisation: top-down and bottom-up [18]. 
The top-down approach is designed for the authorisation at the local level. The local authorisation 
decision is derived from the authorisation policy and user attributes defined by the federation authority. 
After being authenticated at the federation level, if a user initialises an access request to a member 
system’s resource, this request will be passed to the local authority. This local authorisation decision is 
made based on the federation level identity of users and the consistency of the federal and the local 
authorisation policies and user attributes. In this approach, it is mandatory for the federation to ensure 
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that if a user has appropriate attributes (privileges, etc.) at the federation level, that user should also have 
appropriate attributes at the local member system. Otherwise there will be no federated activities allowed 
to be executed at member system level (vertical inconsistencies). This approach is faced with a difficulty 
in matching a local authorisation policy to a federal one and matching the attributes of a user in local 
domain to the federal domain. This problem could be solved by building information mapping 
mechanism between two types of policies and attributes but it is still very complex and costly to deploy 
and maintain. 
On the other hand, the bottom-up approach is designed for the authorisation at the federation level. In 
this case, the federation level authorisation decision is derived from the access control policy and user 
attributes defined by the local member system authority. If the federation activity involves many member 
systems, the final authorisation is a combination of all those local authorisation policies. This approach 
contains a potential problem that if one member system rejects the access request, the activity will be 
denied. In addition, any inconsistencies (horizontal inconsistencies) between the member systems’ 
authorisation policies will lead to the denial of the federation level access request. This approach also has 
problems in synchronising the changes in component systems’ authorisation policies. 
As mention above, in either approach, there will be some problems in maintaining the consistencies 
of user attributes when a change occurs. Several propagation strategies could be applied [5, 17, 18]: 
 
i. Changes should be applied immediately: This strategy provides full consistency of access control 
policies for the whole federation and allows the change to take effect immediately after the change 
happens. However, this strategy increases the administrative cost for monitoring, maintaining and 
synchronising all changes. More seriously, if the federation fails to synchronise the changes, the 
access control process could be severely degraded.  
ii. Changes should be applied periodically: This strategy allows for a period of temporary 
inconsistency.  This helps in saving administrative costs. However, this strategy does not have 
enough flexibility for high-demand access and critical applications. This approach could be found in 
some commercial applications today such as elevator access control, etc. as when a change in access 
control happens; the user needs to allow a certain period of time for the change to take effect. 
However, until the change is effective, a user will not have access to the resource.  Thus any delay in 
taking account of the changes can cause a follow on effect of denying rightful access to the system. 
iii. Changes should be applied at the access time: This strategy also allows temporary inconsistency. 
However, this strategy overcomes the disadvantage of the approach above as when the system 
receives a request from a user, the system will check for the change and if applicable, the new 
change will take effect at the time of access request. This strategy provides high flexibility and fine-
grained synchronisation ability while still being able to maintain the lost administrative costs. 
iv. Changes should be applied on demand (only upon request): This strategy also allows temporary 
inconsistency. However, this strategy allows the change to take effect only when the authority, who 
could be owner or administrator, explicitly states so. This strategy puts substantial power on the 
authority and somehow, looses the necessary flexibility and the mandatory autonomy nature. 
 
After such changes, when a user requests access permissions on a certain resource, it is important for 
the federation to recognise the updates, verify the consistency of user attributes and effectively granting 
the necessary permissions. All the cases above show a strong demand for a mechanism to maintain the 
consistency of user attributes across the federation. 
 
4. Federated Identity Profiling and Attribute Consistency 
Under the umbrella of a federated system, user attributes can be defined at its home system and 
theoretically, can be recognised by other members in the federation. However, with current approaches, 
in order to allow attribute exchange to happen, the exchange process may be required to follow common 
representation syntax which is not always feasible. Benantar (2005) [3] has clearly pointed out that the 
lack of a common set of attributes and a common interpretation of attributes is an impediment for 
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making access control decisions in federated systems. Figure 1 presents a high level concept of federated 
identity profiling. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A high-level concept of federated identity and attribute synchronisation issue 
 
Overall, there are three solution approaches for this problem namely: local profiling, distributed 
profiling, and third party profiling [3]. 
In local profiling, a user is registered with its home system and so the profile attributes of user are 
totally under the control of and maintained by the local system. All other member systems will not have 
knowledge about such attributes until the attributes are exchanged under the trust relationship defined by 
the federation. This approach is well suited for federated systems with a common attribute representation 
and interpretation in which the attribute data is well defined and understood by all members of the 
federation. However, this is also a drawback as it is difficult to achieve such common agreements and the 
cost for maintaining the agreement can be high. 
In distributed profiling, a user can initially register with its home system. Then if necessary, this user 
can further expand and acquire a new profile with a different system. As mentioned above, one of the 
reasons for having additional registrations is the need for new attributes that are specific to a particular 
system. By doing this, the attribute profile of a user is distributed across multiple member system of the 
federation. However, this poses a risk in which the definition of the same attribute may be duplicated and 
thus synchronisation may become an issue. In the context of federated system, this scheme offers the 
advantage of scalability and flexibility and somewhat leads to separation of concerns when it comes to 
managing user attributes among systems. Thus this approach is suitable for large and disparate federated 
systems. 
Unlike the previous two approaches, in third party profiling, a designated third party within the 
established federation is responsible for the management of users’ attribute profile. So member systems 
are effectively removed from this task. The third party may distinguish among profile information that is 
common to all or to a subset of the member systems as well as those that are pertinent to specific ones 
[3]. This approach offers the advantage of having to manage trust establishment with the third party only. 
However, to some extent, this approach utilise a kind of central point of authority which can turn to the 
single point of failure. Moreover, scalability can also be an issue as race condition, which can lead to 
dead-lock, can happen when member systems may contend over the single third party for retrieval and 
update profile information. The replication of the third party may be needed to address such a problem. 
When that happens, the replicas are required to be kept synchronised. Attribute synchronisation problem 
will be limited to the confines of the single third party where attribute profile information of a specific 
system may be duplicated for two or more target systems [3].  
Table 2 provides a comparative overview about three approaches in some key characteristics. 
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Characteristics Local profiling Distributing profiling Third party profiling 
Flexibility Low due to the need of a 
common and well 
defined profile by all 
member systems 
High due to the ability to 
expand and incorporate 
new profile 
Low due to the central 
role of the third party. 
Complexity Low. Simple to manage 
with low trust 
requirements 
High but Difficult to 
manage with high trust 
requirements. Profile may 
be duplicated 
Low. Simple to manage 
due to the central role of 
the third party. Low trust 
requirements (only need 
to trust the third party). 
No duplicated profile 
Scalability Low. Scalability is not a 
matter here as each 
member system in the 
federation maintains their 
own profile information 
and does not need to 
worry about the others. 
High but again high 
scalability comes at a price 
of maintaining attribute 
consistency. 
High as any addition of 
new member system to 
the federation is not a 
simple matter (third 
party control the profile). 
Feasibility Low due to the low 
interoperability 
High but comes at a price 
of maintaining attribute 
consistency.  
High. Substantial cost of 
maintaining attribute 
consistency 
 
Table 2: Some characteristics of the 3 profiling approaches 
 
Based upon the above Table 2, the profiling method selected will depend upon the situation at hand 
and thus should be selected on a case by case basis.   
5. Attribute Synchronisation and Consistency Issue 
Currently, attribute synchronisation can be done via meta-directories [4] and affiliate networks [11]. 
The meta-directory approach federates multiple systems by exposing the user identity to a higher 
level while retaining its relationship to various participating systems in which the identity is known [3, 
4]. The relationships of the global identity to the corresponding local level identities are formed by the 
links binding meta-directory information to the directories of the member systems. So, in this approach, 
common user attributes are maintained by the meta-directory. Updating these attributes is centrally 
undertaken and synchronisation is performed automatically which enables seamless sharing and 
maintenance of identity information. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Joining multiple systems via a meta-directory 
 
Affiliate networks provides a tightly coupled structure by directly mapping an identity defined in one 
system onto a corresponding identity in another system [3, 11]. Updating user identity information 
requires updating all involved systems. It is important to note that mapping an identity is not simply 
about associating names from one system to another. The mapping applies to the attributes associated 
with an identity. Updating such attributes in one directory requires the consistency of user attributes to be 
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maintained across multiple directories. Figure 3 depicts the 3-way identity mapping problem presented 
by the affiliate networks architecture. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Joining 3 systems via affiliate networks and its mapping problem 
 
The meta-directory approach provides a low-cost and simple management mechanism. Due to the 
implementation of the central meta-directory, this approach is suitable for systems under a single 
authority. However, the key drawback of this approach is that it is not scalable enough to accommodate a 
potentially large number of identity domains as the management cost for maintaining large attribute 
profile storage will be too high. In contrast, the affiliate network is more complex and comes at a higher 
management cost. The main difference between this mapping approach and that enabled by meta-
directories is that here the mapping is achieved without actually having to create an additional join in 
directory. So the affiliate network approach has better flexibility and scalability over meta-directories. 
Mapping users across all directories, however, creates management complexities associated with the n-
wise problem, in which the number of mappings grows exponentially as the number of nodes increases 
[3]. Hence, the flexibility and scalability of the affiliate network make it a better solution than the meta-
directory approach.  
 
6. Delegation for Consistency 
Preliminaries 
Delegation is a mechanism of assigning attributes to a user which can be recognised in two forms: 
administrative delegation and user delegation [8]. In administrative delegation, the administrator such as 
security officer, with or without the delegating attributes, will conduct the delegating operations. In 
contrast, user delegation is conducted by user and such delegation requires the user possesses the 
delegating attributes. User delegation is believed short-lived (temporary) and intended for a specific 
purpose or activity [13]. The user who performs the delegation is referred to as a “delegator” and the user 
who receives a delegation is referred to as a “delegatee” [8, 12].  
Attributes can be delegated in two ways: by delegating the whole identity or by delegating some 
specific attributes. Delegating an attribute such as name or permission gives the delegatee the ability to 
use delegated attributes. However, delegating the whole identity gives the delegatee the ability to 
impersonate the delegator with its newly delegated identity. That is, the delegatee is authenticated and 
authorized for the new identity and thereby gains the ability to use attributes associated with this identity.  
In general, delegation of privileges may be classified into (at least) two kinds: grant and transfer [2, 
8]. In grant delegation model, a successful delegation operation allows a delegated access right to be 
available to both the delegator and delegatee. So after a grant delegation, both delegatee and delegator 
will share a common set of attributes. However, in transfer delegation model; following a successful 
delegation operation, the ability to use delegated attributes is transferred to the delegatee and the 
delegated attributes are no longer available to the delegator. Grant delegation model makes the 
availability of attributes increases monotonically with delegations. Grant delegation model is, primarily, 
concerned with allowing the delegatee to use the delegated attributes. On the other hand, in transfer 
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delegation models, besides allowing the delegatee to use the delegated attributes, the mechanism must be 
able to prevent the use of the delegated attributes by the delegator. This requirement makes transfer 
delegation policy enforcement more difficult [1, 8, 13]. 
 
Attribute Delegation 
Initially, when a user, with multiple accounts on multiple systems, wants to take the advantage of 
federation, the user has to choose one of the systems as its home system. This system will become the 
identity provider for this user and other systems, as service providers, rely upon this identity provider 
[Figure 4]. Then the user must link its account on the home system to other system to initialise the 
federation. By doing this, the user maintains a link between the account on the home system to other 
accounts on service providers. 
As discussed above, when roles or permissions, or generally, attributes of the user are changed; the 
changes must be recognised by the federation. In the attribute synchronisation approach, the problem of 
n-wise combination results in a significant overhead and management complexity. It is submitted that 
delegation is a more robust means to achieve the same object.  
Delegation for maintaining attribute consistency can come up with the predefined superset of 
attributes. The superset can be defined as the common agreement of the members of the federation and 
could be considered as the sum of all necessary attributes. A member system of the federation can 
contribute to this overall superset of attributes by introducing attributes of their own. A member system 
therefore may be aware of only a subset of the overall attributes. In a particular member system, some 
attributes for a certain user may not necessarily have values assigned to them. For example, a user who 
does not have an account on a particular service will not require values for any of the attributes that are 
specific to that service. Multi-valued attributes are used to maintain the fact that the same attribute is 
assigned different values depending on the target service in which the user has an account. For example, 
due to conflicting identity management policies, a user may be required to have different values on each 
target service where the user maintains an account [2, 6, 10]. This approach offers the advantage of 
scalability via distributing user attribute profiles. 
 
System 2
System 1 System 4
System K System K+1 System M
- - - - -
FEDERATION
System 3
User A User A’ (A on System 4)
1. Delegation Propose
2. Accept/Reject
3. Attribute Delegation Token (if accepted)
Attribute {A11, A12,…, A1n} Attribute {A41, A42,…, A4n}
Attribute Superset
{{A11, A12,…, A1n};
{A21, A22,…, A2n};
.
.
.
{Am1, Am2,…,Amn}}
 
 
Figure 4: High level architecture of attribute delegation mechanism 
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The use of delegation for maintaining attribute consistency allows the dynamic definition of identity 
attribute. This allows the superset of attributes that can be dynamically redefined and potentially be 
incorporated for more attributes. The following table compare the two approaches in some key 
characteristics. 
 
Characteristic Attribute Synchronisation Delegation 
Attribute 
Consistency 
High but costly and hard to manage High 
Complexity High due to n-wise problem Medium 
Flexibility Low High due to the self-control of the delegation 
process and the ability to delegate and revoke 
the delegated attributes on demand 
Scalability Medium. Scalability dramatically 
decreases when the number of 
systems increases. 
High 
Others Simple for implementation Quite complex for implementation but good 
for accounting and auditing. 
 
Table 3: Attribute Synchronisation vs. Delegation 
 
Primarily, delegation eases the management overheads and provides better scalability, flexibility as 
well as granularity in maintaining consistency.  With delegation, the federation does not really need to 
incorporate the changes of attribute immediately when it happens, but it can use delegation to achieve 
consistency only when necessary. Furthermore, such an approach employs separation of tasks, thus, 
making the process less error prone while updating attributes. Finally, unlike the synchronisation 
approach, delegation is a duplex mechanism as delegation provides revocation functionality to efficiently 
remove the delegated attributes if necessary.  
Thus, in general, delegation offers several advantages in comparing with the attribute 
synchronisation approach. Despite of the complexity in management and implementation, the advantage 
of scalability and flexibility a make delegation an ideal solution for maintaining attribute consistency in 
large scale federated systems. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have studied and analysed the two approaches to provide horizontal consistency of user 
attributes across the federation. In particular, profiling scheme, attribute synchronisation and delegation 
are discussed and analysed as schemes for maintaining consistency. Meta-directory and affiliate network 
are evaluated as two main attribute synchronisation approaches in which affiliate network is proved to be 
more flexible and scalable. We have also shown that the concept of delegation can be used to provide 
consistency for user attribute and is more effective than the current attribute synchronisation approaches 
as discussed in Section 6.  
This research is the first step in a series of investigations to explore the consistency issue in user 
attributes across federation to provide a better scalability, flexibility and granularity in making access 
control decision in federation systems. An immediate priority in future work is to investigate the 
delegation mechanism to see how far delegation can be fit into the federated access control mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the vertical consistency as well as the administration of authorisation will be studies to how 
these factors affect the consistency between Federal and Local access control. A long term goal is to 
develop a proof of concept that implements the studies. 
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